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Achieving finality is one of the fundamental objectives of any dispute resolution process. ’Finality’ 
has two distinct meanings. One sense relates to whether there is any possibility of an appeal within a 
single piece of litigation which may overturn a decision1. The other is whether a decision in one set 
of proceedings can be relitigated in later proceedings.  Appeals are an established feature of court-
based litigation, but tend to be severely restricted when parties decide to use alternative dispute 
resolution (‘ADR’) processes. 
Regarding the second sense of finality, there is an important principle that decisions of competent 
tribunals must be accepted as providing a stable basis for future conduct2. This is commonly 
encapsulated by saying that judicial decisions are res judicata3. For those who like Latin maxims, 
there are three others that are commonly used in this area. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium 
expresses the strong public interest that it concerns the State that law suits are not protracted4. This 
maxim is often paired with the maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, which 
expresses a concept of private justice that no one ought to be troubled or harassed twice for one 
and the same cause5. While these two maxims are often used together, they reflect two distinct 
policies6, one protecting the judicial system as a whole, and the other protecting individual litigants. 
The third maxim is transit in rem judicatam, which means that after judgment a cause of action 
passes into (or becomes) a res judicata. In modern times this third maxim is usually expressed in the 
language of merger: after judgment a cause of action is extinguished and merges with the judgment. 
Put together they emphasise the importance of judgments in court proceedings. A judgment binds 
the parties, so they cannot thereafter sue a second time if their first claim was defeated, or contest 
issues in later proceedings that were decided in earlier litigation. If a claim was successful, the rights 
and obligations of the parties are now defined by the judgment, and they cannot revert to their 
original positions and start again. There has to be finality in litigation. 
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Traditional statements of the principle of res judicata tend to be couched in terms directed at court 
litigation. For example, Professor Elliott7 said that under the doctrine of res judicata: ‘a final 
judgment of a competent court disposes once and for all of the matters decided, so they cannot be 
raised again between the same parties or their privies’. It is just as important that disputes resolved 
by ADR processes should be treated as final and binding as claims adjudicated by the courts. It has 
long been recognised that the public interest in the finality of decisions and the private interest in 
not being vexed by repeated claims, disputes or differences apply in a similar way to both litigation 
and ADR. Professor Elliott goes on to refer to res judicata applying to judgments signed by consent8 
and to arbitrations9. In fact, some of the best known authorities on res judicata are cases where the 
original proceedings were resolved by ADR10.  Nevertheless, there are obvious differences between 
litigation and ADR processes, such as the absence of a State organised trial, and an almost universal 
application of confidentiality to ADR processes, which mean that traditional res judicata principles 
cannot always be applied directly in cases resolved by ADR.  
This article will first consider the principles of res judicata as they apply to court proceedings. It will 
then discuss how these principles apply to the main adjudicative ADR processes, together with the 
adjustments and refinements to those principles that are necessary to deal with the different 
character of ADR processes. It will also consider the theoretical basis for the res judicata principle, 
and how this should inform decisions on whether res judicata and its related principles should apply 
where there are successive claims, disputes or differences  which the parties have sought to resolve 
using ADR processes.    
Res Judicata and Related Principles 
It has long been recognised that the law in this area is not altogether clear11. In England and Wales 
there is no over-arching statutory framework governing the principles of res judicata, although 
aspects of the law are governed by legislation12. Most of the law is to be found in the decided cases, 
which is voluminous and not always consistent. The leading authority on one aspect of this area is 
Henderson v Henderson13 , which has been described as the most cited Victorian case during the 
twentieth century, being cited 290 times in United Kingdom cases, 139 times in Australia, 323 times 
in Canada, and 48 times in the USA14. Yet it has been convincingly argued that most of these cases 
misinterpret the case they rely upon. Reported decisions not infrequently misapply established 
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principles, and there are continuing difficulties caused by inconsistent terminology15, overly-
complicated distinctions16, and the opposite, attempts to conflate distinct sets of principles17. 
Despite the difficult state of the law, the main concepts may be stated as follows: 
(a) A court judgment is conclusive evidence of its existence, date and legal effect18. This follows 
from its status as a formal, public, determination by a court established by the State, and 
whose records are presumed to be accurate. The conclusive nature of court records applies 
to everyone, whether or not they were a party to the proceedings. However, the scope of 
this rule is extremely narrow. It applies only to the fact and wording of the judgment (such 
as that on a particular date a named person was convicted of a particular offence). It does 
not extend to whether the decision was correct, or whether anyone was guilty, innocent, 
committed any breach or anything relating to the accuracy of the decision.  
(b) A judgment in rem has a wider effect than an ordinary judgment in personam in that it 
determines the status of a person or thing, and has universal force rather than just binding 
parties and their privies19. Examples are Family Court findings affecting status, adjudications 
of bankruptcy, grants of probate, and judgments condemning vessels as prize20. 
(c) Judgment in favour of the claimant in a civil claim extinguishes all the rights previously 
available to the claimant flowing from the original cause of action21. This is the doctrine of 
merger, or transit in rem judicatam. A successful claimant is entitled to enforce the 
judgment, but only the judgment22. Merger prevents the claimant from bringing a second set 
of proceedings to enforce the original cause of action even if the judgment was for an 
amount less than the claimant was entitled to23.  
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(d) There are two kinds of estoppels per rem judicatam24. Cause of action estoppel prevents a 
party from asserting or denying the existence of a particular cause of action which has been 
found not to exist in previous proceedings between the same parties25. 
(e) Issue estoppel is an extension of cause of action estoppel, and applies where the same 
parties or their privies are engaged in successive claims based on different causes of action, 
but where an essential issue in the first claim is also an essential issue in the second claim. 
Issue estoppel prevents the parties and their privies in the second claim from asserting that 
an issue is fulfilled if the court in the first claim determined that it was not, or from denying 
that it is fulfilled if the court in the first claim determined that it was26. 
(f) It may be an abuse of process to raise claims, issues or defences which could and should 
have been raised in previous litigation27. This concept does not apply in situations where an 
earlier court has decided the point in dispute, but in cases where the earlier court has not 
decided the point28. It is based on the same policies as inform cause of action and issue 
estoppels, that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be vexed 
twice in the same matter29. 
Defining the requirements for res judicata 
According to Spencer-Bower and Handley30, cause of action estoppel will apply where: 
(a) The decision, whether domestic or foreign, was judicial in the relevant sense; 
(b) It was in fact pronounced; 
(c) The tribunal had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; 
(d) The decision was final and on the merits; 
(e) It determined a question raised in the later litigation; and 
(f) The parties are the same or their privies, or the earlier decision was in rem. 
Where the requirements for cause of action estoppel are met, the earlier decision is an absolute bar 
to later proceedings, and the court has no discretion to hold that res judicata does not apply to the 
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 ed, para 1.02. 
later case31. Similar requirements apply in respect of issue estoppel, but with the important 
difference that issue estoppel will not operate where there are special circumstances32. Issue 
estoppel applies to the issues or necessary conditions for a cause of action. It does not give rise to 
what may be described as ‘fact estoppel’, because it applies to issues rather than to each fact found 
to exist (or not to exist) in previous proceedings33. 
A judgment in default is treated as a final judgment for the purposes of res judicata34. In these cases 
the particulars of claim stand in as a proxy for the judgment of the court35. As there is no reasoned 
judgment, the issues in the original claim need to be scrutinised ‘with extreme particularity’ for the 
purpose of ascertaining the bare essence of what must necessarily and with complete precision have 
been decided36.  
The Spencer-Bower and Handley criteria have the appearance of precision, and were accepted as 
authoritative by the Supreme Court in R (Coke-Wallis) v Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
England and Wales37. Each of the criteria hides a substantial body of case law, and each has a range 
of technical rules and distinctions which are not consistently applied by the courts. They also change 
over time. For example, a less technical approach has been applied to determining whether the 
second set of proceedings involves the same cause of action as the first in more recent times 
because of the extension of the rules on merger to foreign judgments by the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982, s. 3438. It was not until Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc39 that it was 
firmly established that an exception for ‘special circumstances’ applies to issue estoppel, but not to 
cause of action estoppel. Even the law on this latter point is not necessarily fixed for all time, and 
there have already been calls for Parliament to intervene and provide an exception to the rule that 
cause of action estoppel operates as an absolute bar in cases where the absolute bar may result in a 
failure to protect the safety of the public40. 
Henderson v Henderson41 is usually cited for the following principle as enunciated by Wigram V-C: 
‘In trying this question, I believe I state the rule of the court correctly, when I say, that where a given 
matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, 
the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not 
(except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation 
in respect of matter which might have been brought forward, only because they have, from 
negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata 
applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the 
parties to form an opinion and pronounce judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to 
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the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought 
forward at the time.’ 
As has been demonstrated in an article by K.R. Handley in 2002, the actual decision in Henderson v 
Henderson was a conventional application of the rules governing cause of action estoppel42. Despite 
this, it is now far too late to go back. At one time it was thought that a second claim would be an 
abuse of process if it raised a claim that could have been brought in earlier proceedings43.  It was 
firmly established by Johnson v Gore Wood & Co that this went too far, and that the opposite 
tendency, of looking for an abusive element44, was too restrictive. Instead, the court needs to make: 
‘... a broad, merits-based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved 
and also takes account of all the facts in the case, focusing attention on the crucial question 
whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking 
to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before’45. 
 Before Johnson v Gore Wood & Co it had been thought that the court had first to consider whether 
the second claim was potentially an abuse of process, and then to consider whether there were 
special circumstances which would justify allowing it to continue.  Lord Bingham of Cornhill modified 
this approach, and the modern test is to consider whether in all the circumstances a party’s conduct 
is an abuse, rather than to ask whether the conduct is an abuse, and if so, to ask whether the abuse 
can be excused or justified by special circumstances46. 
Theoretical basis 
There is an unresolved issue over the provenance of the res judicata principle. Lord Guest’s view was 
that it is a rule of evidence47. Lord Millett has taken the view that res judicata and all its branches 
should be regarded as a rule of substantive law48. A third view is that it is a rule of pleading49. 
Phipson takes the view50 that no practical consequences flow from this, and the theoretical basis for 
the res judicata principle is rarely mentioned in the cases other than as an occasional throw-away 
line. While the provenance of the principle may make no real difference where both sets of 
proceedings involve litigation in the courts, the question becomes of more direct importance when 
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50
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an ADR process used to resolve one or both of the disputes. How this theoretical difference impacts 
on cases resolved by ADR will be considered further in this article. 
A second theoretical issue is whether the res judicata principle depends on the proceedings being 
adversarial in nature. Diplock LJ certainly thought so in Thoday v Thoday51, where he explained that 
‘... under the rules of the adversary system of procedure upon which the common law of England is 
based, a party is not allowed, in certain circumstances, to prove in litigation particular facts or 
matters which, if proved, would assist him to succeed as plaintiff or defendant in an action. If the 
court is required to exercise an inquisitorial function and may inquire into facts which the parties do 
not choose to prove, or would under the rules of the adversary system be prevented from proving, 
this is a function to which the common law concept of estoppels is alien.’ His lordship went on to 
suggest that it might not be irrational for a court exercising an inquisitorial process to be bound by 
the findings of another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, but commented that such would be a 
different concept from estoppel as then known in English law. 
On this second issue the law certainly has moved on since 1963. It is now settled that res judicata 
applies to overseas judgments, which might well have been decided under an inquisitorial system. 
As shall be seen later, res judicata also applies to previous arbitration awards. While arbitrations 
conducted in England and Wales are traditionally adversarial, arbitrations with seats in England may 
be conducted on an inquisitorial basis52, and this is even more likely where the seat of the arbitration 
is in a civil law jurisdiction. 
Extending res judicata to other dispute resolution processes 
It will be seen from this review of the law that the main authorities on res judicata tend to focus on 
its effect in court proceedings. Not infrequently the earlier judgment will have been given by an 
overseas court53, and there is a whole body of law dealing with the binding effect of judgments from 
overseas. One of the problems in these cases is that definitions of rights of action and their 
requirements, and court procedures, in overseas jurisdictions obviously differ from those in England 
and Wales. While these problems do not prevent parties in later proceedings being estopped, the 
principles of res judicata are applied with caution because of the uncertainties involved54.  
There is also a tendency to talk in terms of the first claim being disposed of at a final hearing. In 
reality a vast number of claims, disputes and differences are disposed of without court proceedings 
being initiated, and, even where they are, only 2 to 3 per cent are decided at trial. The extension of 
res judicata to default judgments, and the use of alternative sources in place of a reasoned judgment 
for the purpose of identifying the claims and issues that will be barred in future proceedings, shows 
that there is flexibility to apply the principles of res judicata to situations beyond cases resolved at 
trial in traditional legal proceedings. 
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Dispute resolution lawyers tend to distinguish between adjudicative and non-adjudicative ADR 
processes55. Adjudicative processes include arbitration, adjudication and some decisions in 
disciplinary processes. Non-adjudicative processes include negotiation, mediation and conciliation56. 
It may be tempting to assume that this distinction would determine whether an ADR process is 
governed by res judicata. While a final resolution of the dispute or difference is required for res 
judicata to apply, it will be seen below that the dividing line does not follow the adjudicative / non-
adjudicative distinction. 
Statutory Tribunals 
Statutory tribunals are only one or two removes away from the established courts, so it is not 
surprising that their decisions have been held to be subject to the rules on res judicata for many 
years. Both Spencer-Bower and Phipson57 have lists of tribunals that are subject to these principles, 
which cover a wide range, including planning appeals58 and decisions of Employment Tribunals59 and 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Res judicata can apply where both proceedings are before 
tribunals, and also where the first decision is that of a tribunal and the second claim is before a 
court60. Cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel do not depend on the earlier claim being 
determined by a reasoned decision, but turn on whether there was a competent tribunal and 
whether a final order has been made61. The need for a competent tribunal means that while tribunal 
decisions can give rise to estoppels, a decision to refuse planning permission will not because this is 
an administrative decision62.  
Under ordinary res judicata principles the earlier decision will be binding only if it is final. This means 
that it must be finally concluded in the first instance court, ignoring any right of appeal. If there is an 
appeal, the first instance decision will cease to be binding if the appeal is successful, in which event 
the binding decision will be that of the appeal court. As mentioned previously, in ordinary litigation a 
default judgment counts as a final judgment for this purpose. A claim that is dismissed in ordinary 
litigation also counts as a final judgment63, but not one that is discontinued64 or one that is struck 
out for non-compliance with procedural orders65. 
Applying this sort of distinction can be difficult in cases decided by tribunals because their 
procedural rules do not always provide for these types of distinctions. Where tribunal rules are 
unclear on whether a particular means of disposal amounts to a final decision, it was suggested in 
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Rothschild Asset Management Ltd v Ako66 that the parties should state the circumstances informing 
their agreement to terminate the tribunal proceedings which may then be included in the tribunal’s 
order. With respect, this is wholly unrealistic. Parties agreeing to terminate tribunal claims (and 
indeed most claims) may have in mind in general terms whether they intend the agreement to be 
final and binding, but are extremely unlikely to have in mind the niceties of the law relating to res 
judicata, or the deficiencies in the procedural rules governing particular tribunals. Tribunals, even 
more than court proceedings, encourage litigants to act in person, which only compounds the 
unreality. 
It has also been assumed by the Court of Appeal that Henderson v Henderson abuse of process 
applies to tribunal decisions67. This seems uncontroversial where the second claim is brought in a 
civil court to which CPR, r. 3.4 applies, because r. 3.4 is now the source of the jurisdiction to strike 
out for abuse of process68. Henderson v Henderson may need to be adapted to meet the special 
circumstances of tribunal cases along similar lines to the discussion below in relation to arbitration 
claims. 
A more difficult question is whether Henderson v Henderson abuse applies where the second claim is 
also in a statutory tribunal. It is suggested that this can only be correct if the tribunal rules 
specifically allow the tribunal to strike out for abuse of process. Whether the theoretical basis for the 
res judicata principle is that it is a rule of evidence or a substantive rule of law (so that cause of 
action estoppel and issue estoppel can apply to tribunals), it must be clear that for the civil courts in 
England and Wales Henderson v Henderson abuse nowadays depends on CPR, r. 3.4. Under normal 
principles, it is only the senior courts that have inherent jurisdiction. Tribunals, like the County Court, 
are creatures of statute and do not have inherent jurisdiction. Henderson v Henderson abuse can 
only be based either on the inherent jurisdiction or a relevant rule of court. For the civil courts in 
England and Wales, that is now CPR, r. 3.4. Also under normal principles, once an area originally 
dealt with under the court’s inherent jurisdiction is codified, the inherent jurisdiction drops away, 
leaving the position covered only by the relevant legislation69. The result must be that for the 
ordinary courts the jurisdiction governing Henderson v Henderson abuse depends on CPR, r. 3.4. It is 
difficult to conceive that tribunals have a jurisdiction to restrain abuse not enjoyed by the civil 
courts. The result must be that Henderson v Henderson abuse is only available in tribunals if the 
statutory instrument laying down the rules for the tribunal expressly provide for striking out for 
abuse of process. 
Disciplinary Tribunals 
It was held by the Supreme Court in R (Coke-Wallis) v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England 
and Wales70 that cause of action estoppel applies to successive disciplinary proceedings heard by a 
professional body’s disciplinary tribunal. As mentioned above, a key question was whether cause of 
action estoppel applied in the same way as in court proceedings, so that the second disciplinary 
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panel was absolutely stopped from reconsidering the complaint, with no exception for special 
circumstances71. To be consistent with statutory tribunals, it must follow that issue estoppel also 
applies, but that Henderson v Henderson abuse does not. 
Internal Disciplinary Processes 
A disciplinary procedure used by an employer investigating a suspected disciplinary offence by an 
employee does not result in the determination of issues establishing legal rights72, and therefore 
does not result in an adjudication for the purposes of res judicata73. The key question is whether the 
process operates independently of the parties, which is not the case with internal dispute resolution 
processes, which are typically staffed by the employer’s own personnel. As a result an employer is 
permitted to hold further disciplinary procedures involving an employee and the same background 
facts, even though this means reopening the decision of the earlier disciplinary process74. 
Arbitration 
Arbitration is an adjudicative dispute resolution process based on an agreement between the parties 
to refer a dispute or difference between them to impartial arbitrators for a decision. It is often seen 
as a private version of litigation. It is therefore not surprising that the principles of res judicata have 
for a long time been held to apply at least to some extent to arbitrations75. While cause of action 
estoppel and issue estoppel may be less controversial76, it has been doubted in modern times 
whether the doctrine of merger can ever apply to arbitrations77. The reasons for the doubt stem 
from the differences between court-based litigation and arbitration. 
As stated by Lord Pearson in F.J. Bloemen Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Gold Coast78, the award of 
an arbitrator differs materially from a court judgment. In court proceedings, the claimant’s right of 
action and the court’s power to award judgment are not derived from the agreement between the 
parties, so when judgment is given by a court it is an entirely fresh departure. An award by an 
arbitrator cannot be seen in isolation from the submission to arbitration under which it was made. 
For this reason the Privy Council expressed the view that there is a distinction between an arbitral 
award, which does not create a fresh cause of action (and hence there is no merger), whereas a 
court judgment does create a fresh cause of action. This view is not favoured by Phipson, and later 
authorities, such as The Rena K79, assume that a cause of action in personam adjudicated upon by an 
arbitral tribunal merges with the tribunal’s award. 
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Other important differences include the restriction on appeals in arbitration to points of law80 , 
which has been said to justify caution before finding an issue estoppel81, and the difficulty in joining 
parties in arbitrations82. Further, the privacy and confidentiality of arbitrations make it difficult for 
non-parties to obtain access to awards for the purpose of establishing estoppels. 
The contractual basis of arbitration was also identified as creating differences from litigation in 
Purser & Co (Hillingdon) v Jackson83. Forbes J pointed out that the public policy in avoiding 
protracted litigation may not have the same application in arbitrations because the parties choose 
their arbitrator. While there is a public interest in arbitrations being conducted properly, there is not 
the same public concern to avoid over-burdening arbitrators with successive arbitrations. Further, 
while the courts will not tolerate ‘serial actions’84, and will require the parties to bring all the claims 
that should be brought together to be advanced in a single set of proceedings, arbitration clauses 
may provide for serial arbitrations of similar points as and when disputes between the parties arise. 
This was the case in EE and Brian Smith (1928) Ltd v Wheatsheaf Mills Ltd85, where the arbitration 
clause  provided: ‘All disputes from time to time arising out of this contract shall be referred to 
arbitration.’ 
Purser & Co (Hillingdon) v Jackson also held that it is the terms of reference of an arbitration that 
defines the issues the arbitrator has to decide. Where an issue is not included in the terms of 
reference of an earlier arbitration between the parties, that issue cannot give rise to an issue 
estoppel in a later reference to arbitration. The converse is that, having chosen to arbitrate a 
dispute, the parties are bound by issue estoppel by the determination of the arbitrator on any issue 
that is relevant to the decision on the dispute referred to arbitration86. As pointed out by Phipson87, 
it depends on the proper construction of the agreement to arbitrate. It is perfectly possible for the 
parties to agree to refer all disputes to arbitration without restriction on the nature of the disputes 
that can be referred, and without giving themselves the right to make serial references. In such a 
situation merger, cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel will all apply88. They apply to partial 
and interim awards as much as to final awards, all of which are ‘final’ for the purposes of res 
judicata89. 
Where this is so, similar restrictions apply as in ordinary litigation. There will be no issue estoppel if 
the point said to give rise to an issue estoppel was not necessary for the original decision, or if the 
original arbitration was between different parties to those involved in the later arbitration90. On the 
latter point, the Court of Appeal in Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v The Lincoln National Life 
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Insurance Co doubted first instance decisions91 to the effect that an issue decided in an earlier 
arbitration award could bind a party to the earlier award who was also a party to the second 
arbitration. The court also rejected an argument that a person who was a party to two arbitrations 
might be bound by an issue decided in the first if it went against him, but not if he succeeded on the 
issue in the first arbitration. Res judicata operates on a mutual basis92 , which is the source of the 
requirement applicable in court proceedings as well as in ADR that these estoppels only operate 
between the same parties and their privies. 
Far more difficult is whether Henderson v Henderson abuse applies in arbitration claims. The paucity 
of authority on the subject supports the conclusion that the general position is that it does not apply 
to arbitrations93. CPR, r. 3.4 does not apply to decisions made by arbitrators. However, the principle 
of party autonomy in arbitrations94 shows there is nothing to prevent the parties to arbitrations 
agreeing that their arbitrators will have the power to strike out for abuse of process. 
Where a dispute is first arbitrated, and followed by court proceedings based on the same facts, the 
court certainly has the power to strike out for abuse of process in r. 3.4. In two first instance cases95 
judges have struck out the subsequent court proceedings for Henderson v Henderson abuse which 
were not covered by res judicata because the parties in the later court proceedings were not the 
same as the parties to the earlier arbitrations. Teare J in Wilson v Sinclair recognised that striking out 
on the basis that court proceedings against a non-party to an arbitration were an abuse of process 
should be reserved for rare cases, but it is submitted that both he and Hamblen J in Arts & Antiques 
Ltd v Richards were far too ready to find the subsequent court proceedings were a collateral attack 
on the earlier arbitral awards on grounds that amounted to little more than the court proceedings 
were inconsistent with the findings of the arbitrators96. These cases go too far. The limitation on 
rights of appeal in arbitrations97, the restrictions on joining parties or intervening in arbitrations98, 
the privacy of arbitrations, and the concept of arbitrability99, are powerful reasons for not extending 
Henderson v Henderson abuse to non-parties. 
Adjudication 
Adjudication100 is an interim dispute resolution process, under which an impartial adjudicator gives a 
decision on a dispute arising during the course of a construction contract101.  While a dispute seeking 
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any type of relief may be referred to adjudication, an adjudicator simply makes a decision, and does 
not have any of the coercive powers available to a court. 
In England and Wales, a construction contract must provide in writing that the adjudicator’s decision 
is binding until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration or agreement102. 
An adjudicator's decision is binding in the sense that the losing party has an immediate obligation to 
pay the sum decided upon. It is also binding for the purposes of res judicata103 in relation to future 
adjudications between the same parties under the same construction contract. The extent to which 
this is so depends on an analysis of the terms and scope of the earlier reference to adjudication104. 
For example, an adjudicator in Vertase Fli Ltd v Squibb Group Ltd105 was not permitted to change his 
mind from the decision he made on an issue decided in the first adjudication which also arose in a 
second adjudication on the same contract between the same parties. 
Res judicata based on an earlier adjudication, however, does not apply to subsequent court or 
arbitral proceedings. The underlying policy of construction industry adjudication is ‘pay now, argue 
later’. There is an implied term106 that either party can reopen the dispute in the courts or through 
arbitration. A court or tribunal will not be bound by the adjudicator’s decision, and can order any 
overpayment to be repaid. To avoid the expense of subsequent litigation, the parties may agree to 
accept the decision of the adjudicator as finally determining the dispute. 
Ombudsmen and Complaints Schemes 
Ombudsmen act rather like umpires in complaints brought by individuals against public or private 
organisations. In addition to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman and the Local 
Government Ombudsman (England), there are ombudsman schemes for a range of different 
consumer services, including many professions, public utility companies such as energy, water, and 
telephones, and financial services such as banks and insurance companies. 
Ombudsmen are independent from the organisations they investigate. Ombudsman schemes usually 
provide that reference to the ombudsman is only permitted after attempting to resolve the 
complaint through an organisation’s internal complaints procedure. It follows from the discussion of 
disciplinary tribunals and internal disciplinary processes above that the res judicata doctrine can 
potentially apply to decisions by ombudsmen, but because of the lack of independence, res judicata 
cannot apply to internal complaints processes. 
It is clear that an ombudsman’s decision can potentially be challenged in judicial review 
proceedings107. A failure by a public body to carry out an ombudsman’s decision can also be 
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challenged in judicial review proceedings108.  These, of course, are challenges based on the original 
decision, rather than relitigating the earlier decision. 
Clark v In Focus Asset Management & Tax Solutions Ltd109 held that the res judicata doctrine can 
apply to decisions of the Financial Ombudsman. Under the Financial Ombudsman scheme110 a 
customer is entitled to complain to the Financial Ombudsman, who will investigate the complaint, 
giving both sides the opportunity to put their case in writing, and if the complaint is upheld may 
award compensation up to a financial limit, which at the time was £100,000111. Mr and Mrs Clark 
made a complaint which they said had a value exceeding £300,000. Their complaint was upheld, and 
the Ombudsman awarded the maximum of £100,000 and recommended that the financial adviser 
should make full compensation. Under the scheme the award became binding only if it was accepted 
by customer. Mr and Mrs Clark accepted the £100,000 stating they did so subject to their right to 
claim more in court proceedings. They in effect used the £100,000 as a fighting fund, and started 
court proceedings against the financial adviser for the rest of their losses. 
Their court proceedings were struck because the complaint to the ombudsman raised a question 
based on facts amounting to a cause of action; the ombudsman made a judicial decision; and the 
court proceedings relied on the same cause of action between the same parties. The burden of 
proving these points rests on the party seeking to strike out for res judicata, in this case the financial 
adviser. It follows from this that not every decision by the Financial Ombudsman will involve res 
judicata. For example, if the complaint referred to the ombudsman does not constitute a cause of 
action (such as a client care or ethics issue not amounting to a legal cause of action), the first 
condition will not be satisfied. Further, Mr and Mrs Clark would not have been estopped if they had 
rejected the ombudsman’s award112. Their purported reservation of the right to claim further 
damages did not prevent them being estopped113. 
Arden LJ inclined to the view that Henderson v Henderson abuse might apply where an 
ombudsman’s decision was followed by court proceedings114. Davis LJ, on the other hand, had 
reservations over this. Complainants before ombudsmen often do not have legal advice, and may 
through lack of experience with legal disputes decide to raise only some of their complaints before 
the ombudsman, not realising that doing so may preclude them from raising them in later 
litigation115. His lordship’s view was that any Henderson v Henderson application following a decision 
by an ombudsman would have to be scrutinised very closely. 
A rather difficult decision is Binns v Firstplus Financial Group plc116, which held that a County Court 
claim following an award of full compensation under the Complaint Handling Procedures of the 
Financial Ombudsman Service would be struck out under CPR, r. 3.4. The case is difficult partly 
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because it misapplies r. 3.4(2)(a)117, and partly because it does not say expressly whether it is 
applying the Henderson v Henderson form of abuse of process. CPR, r. 3.4(2)(b) has been used in the 
company law context as a basis for striking out unfair prejudice proceedings under the Companies 
Act 2008, s. 994, independently of Henderson v Henderson. Where an unfair prejudice petitioner has 
failed to accept a reasonable offer to buy their shares, it is an abuse of the court’s process to 
proceed with litigation where the respondent has already offered the petitioner all the relief that is 
likely to be granted by the court if the proceedings are successful118. Where court proceedings have 
already started at the time of the offer, the proceedings will only be struck out if the offer includes 
the petitioner’s costs. A pre-litigation offer does not need to include costs. On this basis Binns v 
Firstplus Financial Group plc is perfectly compatible with the approach of the House of Lords in 
O’Neill v Phillips, and is to be welcomed both for its encouragement in the use of low-cost ADR 
schemes, and for avoiding unnecessary and disproportionately expensive subsequent court 
proceedings. 
Clark v In Focus Asset Management & Tax Solutions Ltd was based very closely on the terms of the 
Financial Ombudsman scheme. Whether a similar approach is available under other ombudsman 
schemes is an open question. It is suggested that there is scope for applying Clark to at least some 
other schemes. In Clark a point made repeatedly by Arden LJ delivering the leading judgment was 
that the legislation setting up the scheme said in terms that it was ‘... a scheme under which certain 
disputes may be resolved quickly and with minimum formality by an independent person119.’ Similar 
wording is used in the statutory scheme for the Legal Ombudsman, with the Legal Services Act 2007, 
s. 113(1) providing that the purposes of the scheme is to enable complaints to ‘... be resolved quickly 
and with minimum formality by an independent person.’ Like the Financial Ombudsman scheme, 
many complaints to the Legal Ombudsman will amount to causes of action, so there ought to be no 
reason why res judicata should not apply to the Legal Ombudsman as well. 
Conclusion 
The idea that res judicata is a common law doctrine based on the adversarial system should have 
been dispelled long ago. If it had been correct, res judicata would not extend to many non-court-
based dispute resolution processes. In fact, the principle that the parties should not be permitted to 
relitigate their disputes after a final decision is one of almost universal application in most legal 
systems. As discussed in this article, res judicata applies to arbitrations, and it does not matter 
whether the arbitral tribunal adopted an adversarial or inquisitorial procedure.  
It is reasonably common for overseas jurisdictions to recognise arbitral awards as res judicata, at 
least for the purpose of enforcement of the award in their courts, and often for wider purposes as 
well. Many countries have adopted arbitration laws informed by the UNCITRAL Model Law for 
International Commercial Arbitration. Examples include the Arbitration Act in Japan, which provides 
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that an arbitral award has the same effect as a final judgment for the purposes of res judicata120.  In 
China, the Arbitration Law121 recognises the principle of res judicata in respect of arbitral awards. It 
is only if the award is cancelled or if enforcement is disallowed by a People’s Court that the parties 
may re-apply for arbitration or initiate legal proceedings in the People’s Court122. Spain’s Arbitration 
Act, which was passed in 2003, is also based on based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. By art. 43 it 
provides that a final arbitral award has the effects of res judicata and shall only be subject to an 
application for revision in accordance with the procedure established in Spain’s Civil Procedure Act 
for final judgments123.  The Saudi Arbitration Law of 2012 is based heavily on the Egyptian 
Arbitration Law No. 27 of 1994, and has been drafted to be compliant with the UNCITRAL Model 
Law124. By art. 52 it provides that arbitration awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of 
the Saudi Arbitration Law have the authority of res judicata and shall be enforced. The overall 
picture is that a wide range of jurisdictions, with very different legal traditions, recognise res judicata 
principles even for arbitral awards. 
From this it can be safely concluded that res judicata is not dependent on the adversarial nature of 
English common law, and nor is it a rule of pleading with its English common law procedural 
baggage. The strict rules of evidence rarely apply to ADR processes, and the fact the principles of res 
judicata apply to processes such as construction industry adjudications and the decisions of the 
Financial Ombudsman must mean that res judicata is not (or is no longer)  a rule of evidence. The 
strict rules of evidence have not applied for some time to small claims in England and Wales, and no-
one has suggested that res judicata does not apply to small claims decisions. 
That leaves as the remaining theory that res judicata is a substantive rule of law. This view is gaining 
traction in recent decisions125. Such a theory provides a coherent basis for explaining why res 
judicata applies to the range of ADR processes described in this article. As a substantive rule of law, 
this must cover merger, cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. While related to res judicata, 
Henderson v Henderson abuse has a different jurisdictional basis, and is a procedural rule based on 
what is now the CPR, r. 3.4. It is this jurisdictional difference that explains why certain ADR processes 
may be subject to the res judicata doctrine while not being subject to striking out on the Henderson 
v Henderson principle. 
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